Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development by Wagner, Liam et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2
Emissions and Sustainable Development
Liam Wagner and Ian Ross and John Foster and Ben
Hankamer
Economics, Griffith Business School, IMB, University of Queensland,
EEMG, University of Queensland, IMB, University of Queensland
9 March 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/69941/
MPRA Paper No. 69941, posted 16 March 2016 00:16 UTC
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2
Emissions and Sustainable Development
LiamWagner1, Ian Ross2, John Foster3, Ben Hankamer2*
1 Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 2 IMB, The
University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, 3 School of Economics, The University of
Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia
* b.hankamer@imb.uq.edu.au
Abstract
The United Nations Conference on Climate Change (Paris 2015) reached an international
agreement to keep the rise in global average temperature ‘well below 2°C’ and to ‘aim to
limit the increase to 1.5°C’. These reductions will have to be made in the face of rising global
energy demand. Here a thoroughly validated dynamic econometric model (Eq 1) is used to
forecast global energy demand growth (International Energy Agency and BP), which is
driven by an increase of the global population (UN), energy use per person and real GDP
(World Bank and Maddison). Even relatively conservative assumptions put a severe upward
pressure on forecast global energy demand and highlight three areas of concern. First, is
the potential for an exponential increase of fossil fuel consumption, if renewable energy sys-
tems are not rapidly scaled up. Second, implementation of internationally mandated CO2
emission controls are forecast to place serious constraints on fossil fuel use from ~2030
onward, raising energy security implications. Third is the challenge of maintaining the inter-
national ‘pro-growth’ strategy being used to meet poverty alleviation targets, while reducing
CO2 emissions. Our findings place global economists and environmentalists on the same
side as they indicate that the scale up of CO2 neutral renewable energy systems is not only
important to protect against climate change, but to enhance global energy security by reduc-
ing our dependence of fossil fuels and to provide a sustainable basis for economic develop-
ment and poverty alleviation. Very hard choices will have to be made to achieve
‘sustainable development’ goals.
Introduction
The global economy is valued at ~$100tn pa [1] and is powered by the $6tn energy sector [2].
By 2050, expansion of the human population to more than 9 billion people and continued
global economic growth (3.9% pa growth since 1950) [1], will necessitate 50% more fuel [3]
and CO2 emissions cuts of 80% [4], to maintain political, social, fuel and climate security. In
this context extensive studies have been conducted on the documentation of coal [5,6], gas [7],
oil [8–10], nuclear [11] and renewable energy sources [3,12] as well as historical [13] and fore-
cast use [3,12] of these energy sources at the national [14–17] and the international level
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[15,18–22]. The effect of energy security on economics [23,24] and population growth on
energy demand [25] have also been reported. This paper builds on this strong literature base by
presenting a powerful validated global energy use tracker (Fig 1) which accurately accounts for
this data and provides significant advantages over existing models [3,12,26]. The model is
based on the three key variables: Population, energy use per person and economic activity
(gross domestic product, GDP). Fig 1 and extensive statistical testing (see S1 File), strongly sug-
gest that these variables are both ‘necessary and sufficient’ to track global energy demand over
the past 60 years. It provides a solid basis for examining fuel demand with respect to changing
global economic and population driven conditions over a similar time frame. The model uses a
single standard common denominator energy unit (Joules) to replace the plethora of other
units (e.g. million barrels of oil equivalent (Mbbl), British thermal units (BTU), thousand cubic
feet of gas (TCF) and for electricity kilowatt hours (kWh)). This allows technology substitution
to be accounted for based on the cost advantages of a given technology over time as well as
improvements in the conversion process. The model is fully described and has been proven
through rigorous testing using robust and freely available data and practices (see S1 File). It has
also been validated against prominent IEA and EIA reports [3,12,26]. Importantly it extends
beyond the IEA (Blue map target [3]) and EIA models by enabling the critical analysis of all
major interacting factors (i.e. population, GDP, energy use person-1 and energy use GDP-1) the
effects of which appear to have been underestimated in the IEA and EIA reports (Fig 2). In con-
trast our model shows that a dominant factor driving global energy demand is not energy use
GDP-1, but energy use person-1 which is forecast to rise rises rapidly towards 2050, while the
efficiency of production/conversion only gradually improves. The model’s ability to account
for these interactions provides international policy makers with new tools and insights to guide
the development of improved global energy security models and to assist with the development
of effective emissions reductions and poverty alleviation scenarios. Importantly these capabili-
ties challenge the common assumption of the EIA and IEA that increasing efficiency (energy
use GDP-1) will solve our future energy supply problems.
Methodology
This modelling uses Maddison’s GDP data set [27] which is the only annual data set for global
GDP extending back to 1950. The model is estimated using least-squares regression and yields
an R2 value of 0.84 which is remarkably high for a model specified with a dependent variable
that is a rate of growth. It passed all required statistical and econometric tests indicating a high
level of reliability for forecasting exercises (See Methods and S1 File). The proportional change
in energy use over time (dln(Energy(t)) is dependent on the contemporaneous proportional
change in GDP (dln(GDP(t)) and the proportional change in population (dlnPop(t-2) and
dlnPop(t-4)) plus the (log) levels of energy use (ln(Energy(t-1)), population (lnPop(t-1)) and
GDP (lnGDP(t-1)). The coefficients of Eq 1 are: α = 1.143692; β = -1.992702; χ = 4.559912; ε =
-0.134103; φ = 0.129659; ρ = -0.066769. The chosen base year for energy use is 1950 (0.085 ZJ)
[13].
Historical GDP (1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars) and GDP growth (%) for 1950
to 2008 were obtained from the Maddison data set [27]. The GDP and GDP person-1 values for
2009 and 2010 were taken from aWorld Bank data set [1] and suitably adjusted to be consis-
tent with the Maddison data up to 2010 (See S1 File). This estimation has since been confirmed
[28]. Historical world population was obtained from the sameWorld Bank data set [1] and
assumed to stabilize at 9 Billion from 2047, in line with UN medium population growth sce-
nario [29]. Global energy use since 1950 was sourced from [13] and updated and cross checked
with the IEA [12].
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Fig 1. Energy use model: (A) Energy growth predictions compared with historical energy use data. (B)
Historical energy use change in ZJ person-1 (Individual energy use) and ZJ GDP-1 (Economy-wide energy
use). (C) Historical economic growth rates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406.g001
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Documented 1P resources consist of 8.4 ZJ of oil [8,12,30], 6.66 ZJ of natural gas [12,30,31],
20.65 ZJ of coal [5,12,30] and 0.787 ZJ of Uranium [11]). URR consist of 22.77 ZJ of oil [9,10],
28.42 ZJ of natural gas [12], 30 ZJ of coal [5] and 1.57 ZJ of Uranium [11]).
The pathways for the growth in energy use were plotted to show non-renewable fuel deple-
tion trajectories at varying rates of GDP (3.9% ± 1.4% yr-1 since 1950). To impose the addi-
tional constraint on changes in energy use per unit GDP (ZJ GDP-1) with the implementation
of the proposed IEA Blue Map target, an upper limit on the amount of energy used as eco-
nomic growth occurs was imposed.
The Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation Lagrange multiplier test [32,33], (see Table B in S1
File), was performed to demonstrate that the model does not suffer from any serial dependence
between data points. The Durbin–Watson statistic [34,35] (see Table B in S1 File) additionally
shows that this model does not suffer from serial correlation given the time lag components of
the model. These tests which are fully described in the S1 File, demonstrate that this dynamic
model does not suffer from serial correlation effects. Furthermore, to test for stationarity prop-
erties of the time series used in this study we have used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test [36,37]. As shown in Table B to G in S1 File, the null and alternative hypothesis can be
rejected given the t-statistic values being smaller than the required critical values prescribed by
Mackinnon [38,39].
S1 File provides detailed statistical analyses of our estimated model via tests for Serial Corre-
lation, Heteroscedasticity, Ramsey RESET, Unit Roots and Co-Integration (Table A through to
Figure A in S1 File and Table H in S1 File in the Supporting Information). These tests show
that the explanatory variables of the model are both necessary and sufficient to describe the
growth of energy use.
Using data from 1950 to 2010, the observed relationship between global energy demand
(Fig 1A), global gross domestic product and global population was modelled. This model was
specified in growth rates (annual first differences of the natural logarithms of variables) plus
the natural logarithms of the levels of variables. The model is dynamic and allows for lags in
impact. A ‘general-to-specific' methodology was used to yield a parsimonious model through
the elimination of statistically insignificant lags. The structure of this model is reported in Eq 1
with the lags denoted in parenthesis:
dLnðEnergyðtÞÞ ¼ a  dlnðGDPðtÞÞ þ b  dlnðPopðt  2ÞÞ þ w  dlnðPop ðt  4ÞÞ þ ε  lnðEnergyðt  1Þ
þ φ  lnðGDPðt  1ÞÞ þ r lnðPopðt  1ÞÞÞ ð1Þ
The estimated coefficients obtained are: α = 1.14 (11.48); β = -1.99 (-2.30); χ = 4.559912
(5.07); ε = -0.134103 (-4.36); φ = 0.129659 (3.64); ρ = -0.066769 (-3.33) with t-values reported
in parenthesis. The chosen base year for global energy use is 1950 (0.085 ZJ)[13]. The length of
the estimation period is constrained by the Maddison’s global GDP data set [27] which is the
only collection to provide annual data that goes as far back as 1950. The model passes a strin-
gent battery of statistical and econometric tests (see S1 File).
The model captures the relationship between global energy demand, global GDP and global
population over recent history. A tight correlation is observed (Fig 1). There is a large literature
on the direction of causation between energy and GDP which is inconclusive and this is unsur-
prising given their intimate connection [40]. Here we make no assumption concerning the
direction of causality since it is not required for the forecasting exercises undertaken. Our aim
was to establish for a given GDP growth rate, what the correlated energy demand growth is
Fig 2. Historical data and forecasts (to the right of the dotted lines) are shown for relative change in energy use in ZJ GDP-1 (A), and ZJ person-1 (B) for a
range of scenarios.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406.g002
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forecasted to be, irrespective of direction of causation. Under different conditions either energy
availability (e.g. 1973) or GDP growth (e.g. 2008) might drive causality; the model simply
draws the correlation curves and the user can decide whether the input values of the correlated
variables are realistic or not. Widely accepted global projections for population growth have
been used, and GDP per capita rates are based on historical ranges [27,28]. Forecasting scenar-
ios are presented for different assumptions concerning global population growth and economic
growth. Future risks to energy security and CO2 emissions targets were then evaluated (Fig 2).
The independent variables specified as rates of change capture short term impacts and those
in levels capture long term impacts. To summarise, in the short term, a 1% increase in GDP
growth is associated with a 1.14% increase in energy demand growth. The long term impact of
a yearly 1% increase in population growth is associated with a net 4.56% yr-1 increase in the
growth of energy demand. Population growth increases the demand for energy sharply in the
short term; however this is moderated by falling energy use per capita (See Fig 1A and Fig 1B).
It should be noted that the estimated coefficients ε and φ are similar in size but have oppo-
site signs. When we restrict them to be equal by entering (lnEnergy(t-1)–lnGDP(t-1)) as a single
independent variable, the reported result is very similar to an estimated coefficient of -0.14.
What this suggests is that, as energy has been used more efficiently over time, energy demand
has grown in response. This is evidence in support of the hypothesis that the Jevons paradox,
or ‘rebound’ effect has been in operation [41].
Historical energy use
International Energy Agency modelling of energy demand assumes that energy use is highly
correlated with the raw measure of economic activity (GDP) [12]. At the global level it is there-
fore often assumed that, over time, energy efficiency improvements in production contributing
to GDP, will broadly be achieved in most economic sectors and that this will enable global
energy demand to be controlled. Indeed energy use per unit of GDP (ZJ GDP-1) has decreased
by 37% (0.61% yr-1 energy efficiency) since 1950 (Fig 1B red). This improvement in energy effi-
ciency was largely achieved through increasing knowledge and innovation which has driven
technological energy efficiency [42]. However in accordance with the above Jevons paradox
example, rather than reducing energy consumption per person (ZJ Person-1), individuals glob-
ally have used 2.17% yr-1 more energy (Fig 1B green) or 130% more since 1950. The historical
energy use data (Fig 1B) shows that improvements in energy efficiency, raise growth in energy
use. It is also the case that energy demand increases significantly faster than population in the
short term because the damping effect of energy efficiency operates over a longer time lag.
Thus an increase in energy efficiency associated with GDP (Fig 1B red) is also offset by popula-
tion growth effects which are associated with the second part of the Jevons paradox. It should
be emphasised that this additional energy use is not "discretionary" in the usual sense of the
word. It reflects the fact that a higher standard of living intrinsically requires more energy (via
underlying production, regulation and standards, redundancy and range of services). While
some energy is "wasted" by consumers, most of this additional consumption is due to structural
changes that cannot be removed without a discernible downgrading of quality of life (e.g. pov-
erty alleviation).
In summary, although production efficiency per unit of GDP level has increased, each per-
son uses more energy at the same time as global population rises. Thus, the potential for rapidly
increasing energy demand in the future is high as global population is conservatively estimated
to increase towards the widely predicted 9 billion by 2050 and possibly beyond [42].
The result reported in Eq 1 moves beyond the findings of generally accepted models esti-
mated by the International Energy Agency and the Energy Information Agency (DOE). This is
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because the latter are based on energy use per unit of production (ZJ GDP-1; Fig 1B red) but do
not reflect global patterns of energy use per person (ZJ Person-1; Fig 1B green). As most gov-
ernments promote economic growth, poverty alleviation and increased energy equality, using
only ZJ GDP-1 is inadequate. Eq 1 accounts for both simultaneously (see also Fig 1A).
A transition in energy use
Fig 1A charts actual and predicted global energy use time series data from 1950–2010. The
approximately linear trend was likely due to a relatively stable fraction of the global population
(i.e. the G20 nations) using the bulk of global energy (83% in 2010). The rest of the world used
a much smaller fraction. From 2000 to 2010 however, the economies of China (10.38% yr-1
since 2000; compounded GDP increase since 2000 = 196%) and India (7.47% yr-1 since 2000;
compounded GDP increase since 2000 = 120%) in particular, expanded rapidly. Fig 1A clearly
shows that the trend has begun to steepen since 2000.
Global economic growth
Given the importance of global GDP as a variable in Eq 1, its historical range was examined
(Fig 1C: 3.9% +/-1.4% GDP yr-1). Fig 1C also shows that GDP growth is quite volatile. Large
short-term increases in energy prices, as in 1973 and 1979, reduce planned production with
consequent falls in GDP and the consumption of energy. This short run effect is confirmed in
Eq 1 and results in an estimated coefficient on GDP growth in excess of unity, indicating
energy use is highly influenced by changes in economic conditions when all other variables
remain constant. GDP growth fell rapidly from 4.57% in 1973 to 0.41% in 1975 and similarly
during the Iranian revolution (1979). After the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, oil prices quadru-
pled to $96 bbl-1 in 2009 USD while the Iranian Revolution saw Dubai light oil prices [30] rise
from ~$13 bbl-1 to ~$30 bbl-1.
The drop in GDP in both of these examples was equivalent to ~75% of the decline in GDP
during the recent Global Financial Crisis. This illustrates a crucial mechanism that is likely to
be operative into the future: restrictions in energy supply, whether induced by a cartel or rising
costs, raise energy prices and this in turn leads to reductions in production and, thus, GDP and
lower energy consumption. The opposite may occur for a limited period as oil prices drop due
to oversupply as was the case in 2015. However, the operation of the model is agnostic about
which variable is the "driver".
Energy efficiency
The global economic growth rate (3.9%±1.4%yr-1 since 1950) [27] has only dropped below 2%
during major recessions. This growth rate profile resulted in an average annual increase in
energy use of 2.17% person-1 (Fig 1B green). In comparison, global energy efficiency savings
have been significantly lower (0.61%yr-1). This is consistent with the IEA technology perspec-
tives report which concluded that the OECD 11 countries have achieved annual energy effi-
ciency improvements of 0.7% since 1973 [3]. To improve upon this, the International Energy
Agency has proposed a ‘Blue Map Target’ with an additional 0.8% yr-1 energy savings from
2011, yielding 1.41% savings in total [3]. But the rate of increase in energy use (2.17% person-1
yr-1) remains significantly higher than any of the above energy saving scenarios (0%, 0.61% or
1.41%). So, if the world continues along a business-as-usual track (3.9% economic growth yr-1
globally; 0.61% energy savings yr-1) a rapid increase in global energy demand is expected, even
if the global population remained constant. Conversely, a growth in energy demand which
matches either observed or aspirational energy efficiency gains, necessarily requires signifi-
cantly lower GDP growth than historical averages. We conclude that energy demand will most
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development
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likely continue to rise even in the face of modest GDP per capita growth. The forecast global
population increase from ~7 billion in 2008 to ~9 billion people by 2050 and possibly to 14 bil-
lion by 2100, compounds this problem and will likely have serious implications for economic,
energy and climate change policy even if the additional population lives in poverty and uses lit-
tle energy.
Energy demand forecasting
Diagnostic testing of the econometric global energy demand model (Eq 1; Fig 1A) suggests that
it is a robust forecasting tool for the exploration of different scenarios. Fig 2A (red) and Fig 2B
(green) are colour coded to match Fig 1B; red (ZJ GDP-1) and green (ZJ Population-1). In each
case the data to the left of the dotted lines (Fig 2A and 2B), represent the data shown in Fig 1B
but in relative change units. To the right of the dotted line a range of forecasts for different sce-
narios are shown.
Economic energy use (ZJ GDP-1)
Economic energy use refers to energy use per unit of GDP. The baseline model from the IEA
(Fig 2A curve 1) shows the relative change in ZJ GDP-1 at the historical GDP growth rate
(3.9%) and energy savings (0.61%). It forecasts energy efficiency improvements of 24.5%
between 2010–2050. The corresponding Eq 1 model (Fig 2A curve 3) forecasts a similar energy
efficiency improvement (38% for 2010–2050). The difference between these two models is
accounted for by the fact that our model is based on a longer time series (IEA from 1973; Eq 1
from 1950).
The IEA Blue map target (Fig 2A curve 5) represents a 0.8% energy savings per year on top
of the historical savings rate of 0.61% from 1950–2010 (total energy savings = 1.41% per year).
It forecasts energy efficiency improvements of 60% between 2010 and 2050. The corresponding
Eq 1 Blue map implementation (Fig 2A curve 6), also adds an energy efficiency improvement
rate of 0.8% to the endogenised historical energy efficiency rate of 0.61% at the historical GDP
average of 3.9% (total energy saving = 1.41% per year). It forecasts a similar energy efficiency
improvement (69% between 2010–2050). This confirms close agreement between Eq 1 and
IEA modelling in terms of ZJ GDP-1 energy use, both for the baseline models (Fig 2A curves 1
& 3) and the IEA and Eq 1 Blue map models (Fig 2A curves 5 & 6).
As expected, varying the economic growth rate (Fig 2A curves 4 (2.5%), 3 (3.9%) and 2
(5.3%) yr-1 GDP) did not significantly alter energy efficiency improvements between 2010–
2050 (37.5%, 38% and 38.2% respectively) in terms of ZJ GDP-1, further validating the model
in Eq 1.
Individual energy use (ZJ population-1)
Fig 2B shows that individual energy use (ZJ population-1) is strongly influenced by GDP. Fig
2B (curve 6) illustrates the lowest GDP level (2.5% yr-1) and forecasts the lowest rate of change
in energy use (-92% between 2010–2050, i.e. -2.3% yr-1). This is followed by 3.9% GDP growth
models with the highest energy savings rates (Fig 2B (curves 5 and 4; IEA and Eq 1 Blue map
targets). These models forecast increases in energy efficiency of -184% (-4.6% yr-1) and -216%
(-5.4% yr-1) over the 2010–2050 period, respectively. The 3.9% IEA and Eq 1 GDP growth
models with the historical 0.61% yr-1 energy savings rate (Fig 2B curves 3 and 2) resulted in
higher energy use and forecast increases in energy efficiency of -230% (-5.75% yr-1) and -408%
(-10.2% yr-1) over the 2010–2050 period, respectively. The greatest increase in energy use was
for the 5.3% GDP growth rate scenario (Fig 2B curve 1). This forecasts an increase in energy
efficiency of -737% over the 2010–2050 period (-18.42% yr-1). This marked effect of GDP on
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individual energy use (ZJ person-1) is likely due to increased production efficiency (Fig 1B red
ZJ GDP-1) resulting in reduced product prices, or a perceived increase in personal wealth. This
results in a higher individual energy demand rate (Fig 2B). So rather than stabilizing our energy
use through increased production efficiency (Fig 2A) the dominant factor affecting global
energy use appears to be energy use per person (Fig 2B). Indeed continuing along a business as
usual track (Fig 2B curve 2) is forecast to result in a ~300% increase in global energy demand
by 2050. This is at first surprising. However ~50% of the global population has an income of ~
$2.50 per day, and so the aspirational goal of most policy makers, is to remain on a continuous
economic growth track to increase prosperity and enable poverty alleviation. However this is
forecast to result in a very rapid increase in energy demand.
In summary, Eq 1 provides an improved method for examining different forecasting scenar-
ios for energy use, based on ZJ GDP-1, and ZJ Person-1 [12,26]. This provides a basis for esti-
mating fossil fuel depletion rates, based on reported reserves [43].
Forecasting Fossil Fuel Depletion
Reported total fossil fuel reserves vary considerably (36 to 712 ZJ [5,7,8,12]); this influences
depletion dates calculated from them and provides latitude for both optimists, who assume
that prices will expand reserves greatly and pessimists who regard cheaper and more efficient
extraction techniques as simply hastening the inevitable depletion. The higher estimates
account for all predicted reserves, including those that are likely to be too expensive or techni-
cally challenging to extract. For the purposes of this paper, more conservative ZJ values were
also calculated based on the literature [5,8,12,30] via a weighted average for tonnage and the
quality of coal, gas and oil incorporated in each fuel type class (see S1 File). 1P reserves (90%
probability of recovery) and Ultimately Recoverable Resources (URR—5% probability of
recovery) at current fuel prices were determined to be 36.5ZJ (1P) and 82.7ZJ (URR) respec-
tively (see methods) [5,11,12,30]. Fuel reserves were converted to a common ZJ value to allow
total global fossil fuel depletion rates to be forecast (Fig 3) based on realistic settings for eco-
nomic growth and population using Eq 1. For the Fig 3 forecasts, population was assumed to
rise from its current level of ~7 to 9 billion by 2050 and then to stabilize in accordance with the
UN’s medium population growth scenario [29]. The economic growth rates were set at 3.9%
±1.4% yr-1 to represent a range of one standard deviation (SD) since 1950 (Fig 1C 2.5%, 3.9%
and 5.3%). In Fig 2A the historical energy savings rate of 0.61% yr-1 was applied. As the global
economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels (82% of global energy supply), this ‘business-as-
usual’model assumes that the percentage of fossil fuel use will remain constant and that, within
this pool, fossil fuels will be used in an interchangeable manner. This approach was taken to
demonstrate, via a set of the fossil fuel depletion trajectories, that without access to additional
energy sources increasingly severe supply constraints are predicted even for the larger reserve
sizes. This is considered to be a conservative estimate, given the rapid rise of global energy
demand (Fig 2B: Eq 1 3.9% GDP scenario, curve 3) and the current global economic climate. It
is uncertain whether the rate of renewable energy system deployment will be sufficiently fast to
maintain a renewable energy market share of approximately 18.2%.
1P and URR
A key conclusion from Fig 3A, is that, with an international ‘pro-growth’ focus in most econo-
mies and a goal of alleviating poverty internationally (both of which require the maintenance
of historical GDP growth rates), fossil fuel depletion is not forecast to proceed in a linear man-
ner. The rapid rise in global population, the industrialization of developing nations coupled
with compounding economic growth, are the primary factors that can transform growth of
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development
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energy use from a relatively linear path (Fig 1A) to one which more closely resembles exponen-
tial growth (Fig 2B). This contrasts with the linear trend observed between 1950–2000 (accu-
rately modelled log-linearly in Eq 1) which is likely due to a relatively small fraction of the
global population (i.e. G20 nations) using the bulk of global energy (83% in 2010). Currently
50% of the global population lives on less than $2.50 per day (low energy demand).
Setting population to 6.845 billion in Eq 1 has the effect of extrapolating the historical linear
trend observed between 1950–2010 into the future (Fig 3A Extr.) and results in fossil fuel
depletion dates of (URR:2271) and IP (2120). However this requires historically low GDP per
capita growth, and effectively excludes an additional 31% of the 2050 global population from
the benefits of economic growth. This is inconsistent with international ‘pro-growth’ strategies
aimed at alleviating poverty and assumes that poorer nations will be content to (or be com-
pelled to) remain that way.
Fig 3A forecasts energy depletion for a business-as-usual scenario (2.5%–5.3% economic
growth–see Fig 1C; 0.61% Energy savings per year) for the whole global population, in which
1P and URRs would be depleted much earlier (1P Reserves between 2047–2065 (blue curves);
URRs between 2063–2096 (red curves)). The blue and red ‘pin’markers indicate independent
forecasts based on IEA methodology which strongly support Eq 1 forecasts. Both models indi-
cate that all documented 1P reserves would be depleted within ~50 years and all reported URR
(many of which are classified as only having a 5% chance of recovery) within ~80 years, if GDP
growth rates tracks within 3.9% ± 1 SD range observed since 1950 (Fig 1C).
It has long been argued that that estimates of URR are deeply uncertain due to the difficul-
ties associated with prospecting and extraction, because energy prospecting is driven by
demand. In this view, rising energy prices will greatly expand reserves. However, it has been
shown that, as EROI falls, price rises nonlinearly with respect to supply [47,48]. Given the doc-
umented on-going fall in EROI of fossil fuels over the last two decades, and the fact that recent
increases in supply come from better extraction technologies rather than new reserves, it is
unlikely that rising prices will expand supply sufficiently to meet the exponential increase in
demand that would be produced by global GDP growth in a business-as-usual model. Further-
more EROI values of greater than 3 are reported to be required to extract sufficient energy to
enable the infrastructure of modern economies to be maintained [49].
Safely Extractable Reserves (SER)
Using a weighted average (56Mt-CO2/EJ) the combustion of the 1P resources (36 ZJ) would
result in the release of ~2044 billion tonnes of CO2. This is>3.4 times greater than the 600 bil-
lion tonne limit that can be combusted if we remain within the 2°C global warming ‘safe limit’
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change imposed at the United Nations Conference
on Climate Change (Paris 2015). Following a business-as-usual scenario for the total global
population (3.9% GDP, 0.61% energy efficiency savings) would result in Safely extractable
reserves within the 2°C limit being depletion by ~2029 (Fig 3A light orange) [45]. This suggests
that by 2030 the CO2 emissions from the global economy should minimally be in balance with
Fig 3. Fossil fuel depletion model: (A) Modelling of the depletion of Safely Extractable Reserves (SER) to
meet 1.5 (yellow: 480GtC), 2(mid yellow: 570GtC) and 3°C (orange: 609GtC) global warming targets
proposed in [44–46], 1P reserves (red) and URRs (blue) at the historical energy savings rate of 0.61% yr-1
and (B) the 1.41% yr-1 Blue map target using Eq 1. Fuel depletion trajectories are shown at economic growth
rates of 2.5%, 3.5% and 5.9% based on the +/- 1 SD historical rate range (Fig 1C). ‘Extr’ extrapolates the
1950–2010 energy use rate. The pin markers indicate the corresponding depletion dates based on IEA
methodology. (C) Models the effect of increasing renewable energy contribution from the current 18.2% level
up to 80% in URRs (red), IP reserves (blue).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406.g003
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the sustainable rate of global CO2 absorption [50,51] (i.e. ~ 48% of global anthropogenic CO2
emissions in 2010 [50,51], if the 2°C global warming ‘safe limit’ of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change is not to be exceeded [4,52]. To stay within a 1.5°C global warming limit,
safely extractable reserves are forecast to be consumed by 2020 (Fig 3A yellow). While it is pos-
sible that these time-points can be shifted back through rapid adoption of renewables, the
degree to which this is possible is severely limited by the short time frame available to do so.
Even the 3°C limit will, according to this model will be very challenging to meet by 2033 (Fig
3A dark orange)
This model is supported by the fact that Global CO2 emissions are tracking at the upper lev-
els forecast by the IPCC [53,54] as well as by the US DOE which forecasts that energy use will
rise to 0.721–0.852 ZJ by 2035 with economic growth rates ranging from 2.5% (Low), 3.9%
(Medium) and 5.3% (High), scenarios. In comparison, our models yield 2035 energy use values
of 0.759ZJ (2.5% GDP), 1.08 ZJ (3.9% GDP), 1.528 ZJ (5.3% GDP). While at low GDP growth
rates our model agrees well with that of the EIA, it diverges significantly as GDP rises. This is
likely due to the fact the EIA model [26], does not take ZJ person-1 into account, which is
strongly affected by GDP. ‘Extr’ extrapolates the 1950–2010 energy use rate (Fig 3A light orang
dotted line). The pin markers indicate the corresponding depletion dates based on IEA meth-
odology. Fig 3(C) models the effect of increasing renewable energy contribution from the cur-
rent 18.2% level up to 80% in URRs (red), IP reserves (blue).
Energy efficiency and renewable energy
To evaluate the effect of increasing energy efficiency, fuel depletion scenarios based on the Eq 1
Blue map trajectories (1.41% yr-1) were also modelled (Fig 3B). This 1.41% yr-1 energy savings
rate is 2.31 times higher than the historical average of 0.61% since 1950. Even energy savings
measures of this magnitude only extend 1P reserve forecasts (Fig 3B blue curves) by approxi-
mately a decade (2049–2075) and URRs by ~20 years (2068–2117). Similarly, increasing the
percentage of renewable energy supply from the current 18.2% to an 80% renewables level is
forecast to extend 1P reserves from 2052–2088 (Fig 3C blue curves) and URRs to 2074–2112
(Fig 3C red curves) illustrating the forecast increase in energy demand per person (Fig 2B).
Discussion
Energy is essential to human survival and underpins all economy-wide (Fig 1C&1D) and indi-
vidual (Fig 2B) activities. Using global population and GDP data, as specified in Eq 1, it is pos-
sible to model the growth of global energy use robustly, over the 1950–2010 period (Fig 1A).
This provides a solid basis for forecasting energy use (Fig 2A and 2B), fossil fuel depletion (Fig
3) and future CO2 emissions under different scenarios more reliably than IEA models.
Historical data clearly show that energy security is essential to economic, social and political
stability (Fig 1C OPEC Oil Embargo and the Iranian revolution). Our modelling supports a
forecast of continued rise in energy demand which, if supplied mainly by fossil fuels, would
result in fuel supply constraints by mid-century. Meanwhile, internationally stated commit-
ments are to alleviate poverty through ‘pro-growth’ strategies and to simultaneously stay well
below the IPCC 2°C ‘safe limit’ by reducing CO2 emissions [44,46].
Our modelling argues that it is not possible to attain all three goals with fossil fuels alone.
Even maintaining GDP growth per capita at historical levels will lead to energy supply con-
straints within a few decades, with the sharpest price rises towards the end of this time, due to
projected population growth. To innovate away from fossil fuel dependence (~80% of demand
in 2010) requires considerable time, as low-emissions fuel capacity is difficult to expand rapidly
regardless of price increases.
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Furthermore, recent reports suggest that the safe limit should be lowered to a ~1.5°C tempera-
ture rise, further restricting Safely Extractable Reserves (Fig 3A) [45,55]. This position was advo-
cated by 106 of the 195 countries who attended the United Nations Conference on Climate
Change (Paris 2015). This group of nations (e.g. Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Cli-
mate Vulnerable Forum) represents over 1 billion people most vulnerable to climate change.
Securing supply
Because CO2 as a ‘negative externality’ has not been priced into production in every jurisdic-
tion the continued level of subsidies by national governments has led to a global market failure
and earlier onset of climate change [56]. Furthermore, the worst consequences of unprecedent-
edly high greenhouse gas levels on the atmosphere are decades away, and are therefore heavily
discounted by current economic analysis [56]. Thus, without government intervention we have
arrived at the situation where the inadequately regulated free market may not be capable of
effecting a rapid enough transition to sustainable long term CO2 neutral energy systems.
Most of the global population is at the lower end of the income range with few effective
ways to shift away from fossil fuel consumption quickly (e.g. via the installation of solar panels,
micro-hydro and wind generators), except through the use of readily available biomass (e.g. via
deforestation, which would likely result in extensive environmental damage). When govern-
ments try to intervene to provide a workable set of incentives to reduce carbon emissions, fossil
fuel industries have demonstrated strong resistance to efforts to control greenhouse gases and
the price of carbon [57].
Based on results of IEA modelling [3,12] to date, the advent of CO2 sequestration technology
designed to allow continued use of fossil fuels seems less likely than the possibility of alternative
low-C energy sources making up the shortfall. This is because the same price signals that could
drive expansion of fossil fuel use if coupled to CO2 sequestration, also assist the viability of other
low-C technologies. It is quite clear from the results presented here, that even if the expected
entry timing of utility scale CCS technology is met [3,12], this will still result in a failure to ade-
quately reduce CO2 levels and our results question the ability for this technology to maintain a
reliable energy supply in light of the Safely Extractable Reserve constraint (see Fig 3A).
The results reported in this paper suggest that even stabilizing fossil fuel use will be politi-
cally challenging. Despite the>1000% increase in non-hydro renewables between 1990 and
2014 renewable energy systems deployment, the percentage of energy derived from renewables
has not increased at a rate capable of keeping up with the growth in global energy demand and
only makes a small contribution to primary energy supplies. To achieve significant CO2 emis-
sions reductions without a requires:
1. the prolonged reduction of global economic growth to levels lower than those prevailing
after the recent Global Financial Crisis (which negatively impacts poverty alleviation)
2. a reduction in population growth more rapid than generally projected for example through
increased equality, education and employment of women (reduction not yet noted)
3. a significantly increased energy efficiency (e.g. the Blue map target) beyond historical prece-
dent and/or
4. a rapid transition to CO2 neutral renewable energy sources.
Based on this we conclude that globally it is essential to accelerate the transition to sustain-
able long term, CO2-neutral energy systems if continued prosperity is to be achieved. Tap-
ping into the huge energy resource of the sun (3020 ZJ yr-1 vs. ~0.56ZJ yr-1 total global
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energy demand) is one such option both to produce electricity (20% of global energy
demand) and fuels (80% of energy demand) [58].
Our findings show that it is critically important that policy makers factor in the potentially
rapid decline not only of 1P and URR’s as well as the limits posed by ‘Safely Extractable
Reserves (SER). It is particularly important to establish whether it is economically advanta-
geous to continue investing heavily in next generation fossil fuel-based infrastructure for rela-
tively short term gain, rather than transitioning in a controlled but rapid manner to renewable
energy technologies that are capable of supporting the global economy into the future. Markets
may flexibly and efficiently meet the need for sustainable energy systems, but only if global gov-
ernments set the required legal frameworks.
Potential transition strategy
The question of the relative costs of fossil fuels and sustainable low-emissions energy systems
can be partially addressed by examining current subsidies. A transition to long term CO2 neu-
tral energy systems could be supported through the global reduction of oil and coal industry
subsidies, with cost-savings facilitating the establishment of new low-C-emissions fuel indus-
tries. Clearly, expediting the introduction of effective and workable international carbon tax/
trading schemes to encourage CO2 neutral technology deployment is also desirable. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund has estimated that the global cost of subsidizing gasoline, diesel and
kerosene exceeded US$500 billion per year in 2008. Furthermore, the IEA in 2012 estimated
that the consumer subsidy for all fossil fuels to be US$523 billion [12,59]. [60]. The costs of cli-
mate change are higher and have been estimated ~ 1% per year of GDP [56,61], ~US$755 Bil-
lion (PPP 2014) [1]. The removal of fossil fuel subsidies and the phase out of nuclear power in
conjunction with the implementation climate change mitigation strategies is forecast to result
in an only small decrease in GDP (-0.3% in 2035 [59]) which is well within the standard devia-
tion observed over the last 60 years. The annual fossil fuel subsidy is, the equivalent of ~US
$18bbl [60] and corresponds to approximately 10% of the ~$6tn global energy sector [2].
Importantly these subsidies have the effect of locking in the use of fossil fuel based energy
sources and slowing down the uptake of clean energy alternatives. Governments could, in a
cost neutral manner, correct the prevailing subsidies and incentives in a way that would protect
against fuel poverty while encouraging fuel security, CO2 emissions reductions and sustainable
long term economic stability. This could for example be achieved by settings increasingly strin-
gent EROI and greenhouse gas emissions targets over time and transitioning subsidies from
current fossil fuel technologies to those technologies capable of meeting them.
Environment and economy
At the Paris Climate Change Summit, firm CO2 reduction targets were implemented to restrain
global temperatures rises to2°C. However, the perception that this target will have negative
impacts on national economies, as with the previous Copenhagen and Cancun Climate Change
Summits persists. In contrast, our findings strongly suggest that persistently seeking high eco-
nomic growth through fossil fuel use will not only accelerate CO2 emissions but eventually
induce a fuel security problem which could have a catastrophic effect on many poor people in
developing countries facing higher energy prices, as well as leading to increased consequences
of climate change. Our scenarios place global economists and environmentalists on the same
side as reductions in CO2 emissions and the enhancement of energy security (and, thus,
human economic welfare) both require significant reductions of fossil fuel combustion.
Whether or not the global private sector can foresee or address the exhaustion of reserves and
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enact rapid switches to alternative sources of energy remains an open question. The noted ten-
dency for businesses to heavily discount the future in making investment decisions would sug-
gest that such a transition will be slow unless appropriate price incentives are put in place to
compensate for ‘market failures’. This seems to be the primary role of governments but they
are constrained by short term political considerations that make long term environmental pol-
icy very difficult to enact, unless bipartisan support can be secured for defined and enforceable
targets. We note, however, that the sheer scale of sustainable fuel supply required makes this a
massive, long-term stable global market which promises significant financial gain for successful
companies.
Supporting Information
S1 File. PLOS_supps_v3.docx. General Statistical Tests for the Energy Growth Model.
(Table A). Multi-Variable Linear Model Represented as a Difference Equation of the Change in
Levels, with Residuals (Figure A). Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (Table B). Het-
eroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (Table C). Ramsey RESET Test (Table D). Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on DLGDP (Table E). Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit
Root Test on DLENERGY (Table F). Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test on DLPOP
(Table G). Johansen Co-Integration Test Summary (Table H).
(DOCX)
Acknowledgments
BH would like to thank the Australian Research Council [DP0877147, LP0883380, and
DP1093287], The University of Queensland, Queensland government. BH thanks the Eisen-
hower Fellowship scheme for its financial support.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: LW IR BH. Performed the experiments: LW JF BH.
Analyzed the data: LW IR JF BH. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: LW IR JF BH.
Wrote the paper: LW IR JF BH.
References
1. World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators. World Bank.
2. Dittrick P, Izundu U (2008) OTC speakers highlight offshore industry’s future. Oil Gas J 12: 20.
3. IEA (2010) Energy Technology Perspectives 2010: Scenarios and Strategies to 2050. Paris.
4. UNFCC (2010) Cancun Accord. Cancun: UNFCCC.
5. Mohr SH, Evans G. M. (2009) Forecasting coal production until 2100. Fuel 88: 2059–2067
6. Heinberg R, Fridley D (2010) The end of cheap coal. Nature 468: 367–369. doi: 10.1038/468367a
PMID: 21085152
7. GEA (2012) Global Energy Assessment–Toward a Sustainable Future. Cambridge UK and New York,
NY, USA and Laxenburg, Austria: Cambridge University Press and the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis.
8. Mohr SH, Evans GM (2010) Long term prediction of unconventional oil production. Energy Policy 38:
265–276.
9. Bentley RW, Mannan S. A. andWheeler S. J. (2007) Assessing the date of the global oil peak: The
need to use 2P reserves. Energy Policy 35: 6364–6382.
10. Kjarstad J, Johnsson F. (2009) Resources and future supply of oil. Energy Policy 37: 441–464.
11. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (2007) Uranium 2007: Resources, Production and Demand: OECD.
12. IEA (2012) World Energy Outlook, 2012: International Energy Agency.
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406 March 9, 2016 15 / 17
13. Grubler A (1998) Technology and Global Change: Cambridge University Press.
14. Ang JB (2007) CO2 emissions, energy consumption, and output in France. Energy Policy 35: 4772–
4778.
15. Huang B- N, Hwang MJ, Yang CW (2008) Causal relationship between energy consumption and GDP
growth revisited: A dynamic panel data approach. Ecological Economics 67: 41–54.
16. Stern DI (2000) A multivariate cointegration analysis of the role of energy in the USmacroeconomy.
Energy Economics 22: 267–283.
17. Kander A, Stern DI (2014) Economic growth and the transition from traditional to modern energy in
Sweden. Energy Economics 46: 56–65.
18. Narayan PK, Prasad A (2008) Electricity consumption–real GDP causality nexus: Evidence from a
bootstrapped causality test for 30 OECD countries. Energy Policy 36: 910–918.
19. Soytas U, Sari R (2006) Energy consumption and income in G-7 countries. Journal of Policy Modeling
28: 739–750.
20. Chontanawat J, Hunt LC, Pierse R (2008) Does energy consumption cause economic growth?: Evi-
dence from a systematic study of over 100 countries. Journal of Policy Modeling 30: 209–220.
21. Balcilar M, Ozdemir ZA, Arslanturk Y (2010) Economic growth and energy consumption causal nexus
viewed through a bootstrap rolling window. Energy Economics 32: 1398–1410.
22. Stern DI (2011) The role of energy in economic growth. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
1219: 26–51. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05921.x PMID: 21332491
23. Frondel M, Schmidt CM (2014) A measure of a nation's physical energy supply risk. The Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance 54: 208–215.
24. Lefèvre N (2010) Measuring the energy security implications of fossil fuel resource concentration.
Energy Policy 38: 1635–1644.
25. DeLong JP, Burger O (2015) Socio-Economic Instability and the Scaling of Energy Use with Population
Size. PloS one 10: e0130547. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0130547 PMID: 26091499
26. EIA (2011) International Enery Outlook 2011. Energy Information Agency, US Department of Energy.
27. Maddison A (2007) The world economy volume 1: A millennial perspective volume 2: Historical statis-
tics: Academic Foundation.
28. Bolt J, van Zanden JL (2013) The First Update of the Maddison Project; Re-Estimating Growth Before
1820. Maddison-Project Working Paper WP-4, University of Groningen, January 5.
29. UNDepartment of Economic & Social Affairs Population Division (2004) World Population to 2300.
30. BP (2013) Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. London.
31. ENI (2013) World Oil and Gas Review.
32. Breusch TS (1978) TESTING FOR AUTOCORRELATION IN DYNAMIC LINEARMODELS*. Austra-
lian Economic Papers 17: 334–355.
33. Godfrey LG (1978) Testing Against General Autoregressive and Moving Average Error Models when
the Regressors Include Lagged Dependent Variables. Econometrica 46: 1293–1301.
34. Durbin J, Watson GS (1950) Testing for serial correlation in least squares regression. I. Biometrika 37:
409–428. PMID: 14801065
35. Durbin J, Watson GS (1951) Testing for serial correlation in least squares regression. II. Biometrika:
159–177. PMID: 14848121
36. Dickey DA, Fuller WA (1979) Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series With a Unit
Root. Journal of the American Statistical Association 74: 427–431.
37. Dickey DA, Fuller WA (1981) Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time series with a unit root.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society: 1057–1072.
38. MacKinnon JG (1996) Numerical distribution functions for unit root and cointegration tests. Journal of
applied econometrics 11: 601–618.
39. MacKinnon JG (2010) Critical values for cointegration tests. Queen's Economics Department Working
Paper.
40. Chiou-Wei SZ, Chen C-F, Zhu Z (2008) Economic growth and energy consumption revisited—evidence
from linear and nonlinear Granger causality. Energy Economics 30: 3063–3076.
41. Stern DI, Enflo K (2013) Causality between energy and output in the long-run. Energy Economics 39:
135–146.
42. Foster J (2011) Energy, aesthetics and knowledge in complex economic systems. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization 80: 88–100.
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406 March 9, 2016 16 / 17
43. Kalimeris P, Richardson C, Bithas K (2014) A meta-analysis investigation of the direction of the energy-
GDP causal relationship: implications for the growth-degrowth dialogue. Journal of Cleaner Production
67: 1–13.
44. Change). UUNFCoC (2015) Adoption of the Paris Agreement. United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change Conference of the Parties,. Paris.
45. Steinacher M, Joos F, Stocker TF (2013) Allowable carbon emissions lowered by multiple climate tar-
gets. Nature.
46. Rogelj J, Hare W, Lowe J, van Vuuren DP, Riahi K, Matthews B, et al. (2011) Emission pathways con-
sistent with a 2 [thinsp][deg] C global temperature limit. Nature Climate Change 1: 413–418.
47. King CW, Hall CA (2011) Relating financial and energy return on investment. Sustainability 3: 1810–
1832.
48. Heun MK, deWit M (2012) Energy return on (energy) invested (EROI), oil prices, and energy transi-
tions. Energy Policy 40: 147–158.
49. Hall CA, Balogh S, Murphy DJ (2009) What is the minimum EROI that a sustainable society must
have? Energies 2: 25–47.
50. Lal R (2008) Carbon sequestration. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Bio-
logical Sciences 363: 815–830. PMID: 17761468
51. Lenton TM (2010) The potential for land-based biological CO2 removal to lower future atmospheric
CO2 concentration. Carbon Management 1: 145–160.
52. UNFCC (2009) Copenhagen Accord. Copenhagen: UNFCCC.
53. Raupach MR, Marland G, Ciais P, Le Quéré C, Canadell JG, Klepper G, et al. (2007) Global and
regional drivers of accelerating CO2 emissions. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
104: 10288–10293.
54. Peters GP, Marland G, Le Quere C, Boden T, Canadell JG, Raupach MR (2012) Rapid growth in CO2
emissions after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. Nature Clim Change 2: 2–4.
55. Stocker BD, Roth R, Joos F, Spahni R, Steinacher M, Zaehle S, et al. (2013) Multiple greenhouse-gas
feedbacks from the land biosphere under future climate change scenarios. Nature Climate Change.
56. Stern NH, Treasury HMs (2006) Stern Review: The economics of climate change: HM treasury London.
57. Klein N (2014) This changes everything: capitalism vs. the climate: Simon and Schuster.
58. Smil V (2003) Energy at the Crossroads. Global Perspectives and Uncertainties.
59. Magné B, Chateau J, Dellink R (2014) Global implications of joint fossil fuel subsidy reform and nuclear
phase-out: an economic analysis. Climatic Change 123: 677–690.
60. Pascual C, Elkind J (2010) Energy security: economics, politics, strategies, and implications: Brook-
ings Institution Press.
61. Garnaut R (2008) The Garnaut climate change review. Cambridge, Cambridge.
Trading Off Global Fuel Supply, CO2 Emissions and Sustainable Development
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0149406 March 9, 2016 17 / 17
